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This article deals with the much debated 
“L’Aquila case” concerning the trial of five 
scientists and two public officials following 
the earthquake in the Italian region of Abruz-
zo on April 6, 2009. It summarizes the events 
preceding the earthquake and then clarifies 
the reasons for the indictment and the ver-
dict. Finally it discusses the reactions in the 
media and the scientific community and re­
commends a public debate on the role of sci-
entific advice beyond the specific case.
1 Introduction
In this article I address a case which generated 
uproar and even scandal in the scientific commu-
nity and hit the media headlines for a long time, 
i.e. the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake and the conse-
quent trial of five scientists and two public offi-
cials accused of multiple manslaughter.
I fully agree with Alexander that “it would 
be unwise to consider the trial of the ‘L’Aquila 
Seven’ without careful consideration of its social, 
political and cultural referents and its context 
within the progress of the earthquake emergency” 
(Alexander 2014, p. 1161). Here I will not explore 
in detail the multiple and intricate aspects of this 
specific case; instead I will take it as an opportu-
nity to discuss the role of scientific advice in so-
cially relevant (in this case risk-related) matters. 
The understanding of the advisers’ professional 
tasks and moral responsibility – if not their legal 
liability – is related to the clarification of that role. 
More specifically, I do not intend to comment on 
the trial itself, its appropriateness, fairness and 
(provisional) conclusion, but I will rather focus 
on the reactions it generated in different arenas, 
most notably the scientific community. That will 
provide an opportunity to show how differently 
the role of scientific advisers can be conceived in 
the management and communication of highly 
complex and uncertain situations.
It is firstly necessary to set the scene in some 
detail. I will start with an account of the earthquake 
and the preceding events and continue with a sum-
mary of the trial, accounting for both the actual 
terms in which the accusation and the verdict were 
formulated and the way in which they were broad-
ly publicized and broadcasted. I will then focus on 
my main topic of interest as sketched above.
2 The Earthquake and the Preceding Events
On April 6, 2009, a 6.3 moment magnitude 
(MW) earthquake devastated the city of L’Aqui-
la, capital of the Italian region of Abruzzo, and 
some neighbouring municipalities. In total, there 
were 309 casualties, about 1,600 injured, whilst 
the numbers of buildings damaged and people 
evacuated are counted in tens of thousands. Five 
years after the event the situation remains tragic 
and L’Aquila is largely a city in ruins.
In the four months preceding the major 
quake a large number of sporadic low-magni-
tude tremors (a seismic swarm) had occurred 
and, understandably, the residents were alarmed 
and stressed. In such a tense atmosphere, an un-
official warning captured large media attention. 
On the basis of radon measurements he had per-
formed, Giampaolo Giuliani, a technician for-
merly working at a laboratory of the National 
Research Council (CNR), developed the con-
viction that a major earthquake was soon going 
to occur in the area and insisted, together with 
some local authorities, that the population should 
be alerted. He also had some hypotheses on the 
where and when of the event, which later proved 
both wrong (Jordan et al. 2011, p. 323).
Giuliani’s conjecture and the further anxi-
ety it created among the population outraged the 
then head of the national Dipartimento della Pro-
tezione Civile (DPC – Department of Civil Pro-
tection), Guido Bertolaso, who threatened to sue 
him for diffusing alarming news. Bertolaso also 
convened a meeting of the Commissione Grandi 
Rischi (CGR – Major Risks Commission), to be 
held in L’Aquila on March 31, 2009.
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The Commissione Grandi Rischi, short for 
Commissione Nazionale per la Previsione e la 
Prevenzione dei Grandi Rischi (National Com-
mission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major 
Risks) is an advisory body of the DPC, composed 
of experts in seismic, volcanic, hydrological and 
other risks. Its activity is consultative, technical, 
scientific, proactive and includes guidance in the 
forecast and prevention of various risk situations. 
Its organisation, functions and composition have 
been partially modified in October 2011 by a De-
cree of the Prime Minister (DPC 2014).
In the press release of 30 March 2009 an-
nouncing the meeting it was stated that its purpose 
was to provide the citizens of Abruzzo with all 
the information on the seismic activity in recent 
weeks that was available to the scientific commu-
nity. A somewhat different objective was illustrat-
ed by Guido Bertolaso in a disclosed phone call 
to the Abruzzo Region Councillor for Civil Pro-
tection Daniela Stati. On that occasion he defined 
the meeting as a “media operation” (operazione 
mediatica) which would bring the top experts in 
the field of seismology to L’Aquila. By giving the 
floor to them – he said – it will be immediately 
possible “to silence any imbecile and calm down 
rumours, preoccupations, etc.” (in modo da zittire 
subito qualsiasi imbecille, placare illazioni, pre-
occupazioni eccetera). He also anticipated a the-
sis that, in his view, the scientists would defend, 
i.e. that a seismic swarm was a positive phenom-
enon in so that it discharged energy preventing 
a deadly shock (cento scosse servono a liberare 
energia e non ci sarà mai la scossa quella che fa 
male) (Tribunale di L’Aquila 2012, pp. 151–152).
In his subsequent testimony in Court Berto-
laso, by then no longer the head of the DPC, was 
asked about the above-mentioned phone call and 
the purpose of the meeting and reaffirmed the ne-
cessity to reassure the population, strained by the 
alarming information which was circulating but 
lacked any scientific basis (Tribunale di L’Aquila 
2012, pp. 150–157).
The meeting of March 31, 2009 – which was 
judged unusual in many respects by some of the 
defendants, both in Court and on other occasions, 
– was followed by a press conference where no 
specific measures of protection were suggested to 
the citizens, while it was reaffirmed that no sci-
entifically sound method existed to predict earth-
quakes. On this occasion, some of the participants 
gave interviews. In one of these (broadcasted af-
ter the meeting, but apparently recorded earlier) 
Bernardo De Bernardinis, then deputy director of 
the DPC technical-operative sector (Vice Capo 
settore tecnico-operativo), stated that the seismic 
situation in L’Aquila was normal and actually fa-
vourable because of the continuous discharge of 
energy due to the seismic swarm. This is the same 
thesis which had been illustrated by Bertolaso in 
the previously mentioned phone call. De Bernar-
dinis also replied positively to the question by a 
journalist about whether he would recommend 
people to relax with the help of a glass of local 
wine, a joke that proved to be a tragic one.
3 The Allegation and the Trial
If the purpose of the meeting, as it appears, was to 
dispel preoccupation and alarm among the pop-
ulation stressed by months of repeated shocks 
and to quash rumours and controversies fuelled 
by Giampaolo Giuliani’s declarations, it can 
be claimed that this was successfully achieved. 
Unfortunately, just six days after the meeting, a 
major earthquake occurred in the area with the 
previously mentioned devastating consequences.
The indictment of the 7 defendants followed 
a complaint submitted to the L’Aquila prosecu-
tor’s office by some relatives of the 37 victims 
killed in the event and by 5 injured people. They 
claimed that their loved ones had died (in the 
former case) and that they themselves had been 
injured (in the latter) because they had trusted the 
official reassurance provided by the competent 
authorities and had consequently neglected the 
usual precautions (mainly leaving their houses) 
that they were used to take, out of habit and local 
knowledge passed on from one generation to the 
next. Indeed, the deadly shock which occurred 
at 3:32 a.m. had been preceded by a strong fore-
shock some three hours earlier. If taken as a 
warning – it was claimed – this would have in-
duced a potentially life-saving behaviour from 
the part of those that instead remained at home, 
believing that the situation was “normal”.
The legal case developed as follows: In June 
2010 five scientists and two public officials who 
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had taken part in the meeting of March 31, 2009 
received a notice of investigation. On May 25, 
2011 they were indicted by the Court of L’Aquila 
of multiple manslaughter and injuries in relation 
to the earthquake, for “failing to provide complete 
and precise information, which might have saved 
many people’s lives”. In particular, the allegation 
was of not having taken into account and duly 
communicated all the elements of risk derived, 
for example, from the state of some vulnerable 
buildings, including public ones, which could and 
should have been closely monitored and possibly 
evacuated. Throughout the whole procedure and 
in the verdict, the defendants were described as 
“members of the CGR”, although only four of 
them formally were at the time of the meeting.
The trial began in L’Aquila on September 
20, 2011, and thirteen months later, on October 
22, 2012, the Court issued its verdict, support-
ed by 944 pages of argument and documentation 
(Tribunale di L’Aquila 2012). Judge Marco Billi 
found the 7 defendants guilty in 29 out of the 37 
cases of death presented by the plaintiffs and in 
4 out of 5 cases of injuries, and acquitted them 
in 8 and 1 case respectively. The culprits were 
sentenced to six years in prison and to pay huge 
compensation to the victims. They were also per-
manently barred from holding public office.
The motivation of the verdict was that, on the 
occasion of the CGR meeting preceding the earth-
quake, the defendants’ assessment of the risks con-
nected to the seismic activity under way had been 
“approximate, generic and ineffective in relation 
to the activities and duties of forecast and preven-
tion” (approssimativa, generica ed inefficace in 
relazione alle attività e ai doveri di previsione e 
prevenzione) (Tribunale di L’Aquila 2012, p. 2). 
Also, that the information they had provided to the 
authorities, the press and the L’Aquila citizens on 
the nature, the causes, the dangers and the future 
developments of the ongoing seismic activity had 
been “incomplete, inaccurate and contradictory” 
(imprecise incomplete e contraddittorie) (ibid.).
Since all the defendants have appealed 
against the first instance judgment, its applica-
tion is suspended, including the ban from public 
office. The Court of Appelas of L’Aquila started 
the procedures for the second instance judgment 
on October 10, 2014.
4 The Reactions and the Omission of Key 
Issues
Since the notice of investigation was made pub-
lic (June 2010), a massive campaign in favour of 
the seven defendants started, which continued 
throughout the trial and after the verdict. Letters 
were written, petitions were signed by thousands 
of scientists, including one presented to the Pres-
ident of Italy, Giorgio Napolitano, by the CEO 
of the AAAS (American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science). The prevailing – though 
not unanimous – reading of the trial was that it 
was an attack on science and the indictment was 
rephrased as one of not having predicted the 
earthquake. Thus a generalization and an abstrac-
tion were accomplished: at issue was not the in-
dictment (fair or not) of seven specific individuals 
for their actions (or inactions) in a definite situa-
tion, but the discredit of science and its methods 
due to ignorance, disrespect or other malevolent 
attitudes. The media, including important scien-
tific journals, largely endorsed those interpreta-
tions, although some more precise and detailed 
accounts were also offered (e.g. Hall 2011).
All internal dissent, which is so common 
and – I would add – vital in the scientific commu-
nity, evaporated and most of its members united 
in a common battle framed in terms of scientific 
independence and neutrality, based on claims of 
indisputable objectivity and morality of the sci-
entific endeavour per se. I have no elements to 
evaluate to what extent the subscribers of the pe-
titions were informed about the situation. In any 
case, the overall result was that the importance 
of a (much needed) debate on the role of scien-
tific advice was totally downplayed. Instead, it 
became some sort of principled defence of the 
type more commonly seen in the case of a union 
defending its members. In the meantime, those 
who dissented often followed the opposite and, 
in my view, equally ineffective path of interpret-
ing the facts only in terms of personal interest or 
corruption of those under accusation.
For those found guilty and their lawyers it 
is all but logical and legitimate to try to justify 
their actions and obtain a different verdict in the 
second instance, but the debate outside the court-
room would profit from a broader definition of the 
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problem and from being conducted in a style and 
language different from those proper to a trial.
In my view, the key question to be addressed 
in an enlarged societal forum is: what is scientific 
policy advice, and how does it differ from oth-
er scientific activities? Sir Peter Gluckman pro-
vided a very convincing answer to such a query, 
relevant as it comes from a scientist who, in his 
capacity of Chief Science Adviser to the Prime 
Minister of New Zealand, has first-hand experi-
ence on the matter. In his words: “Science advice 
is not generally a matter of dealing with the easy 
issues [my italics] that need technical solutions. 
Rather it is largely sought in dealing with sensi-
tive matters of high public concern and inevita-
bly associated with uncertainty and considerable 
scientific and political complexity.” (Gluckman 
2014, p. 4) While fully acknowledging that 
“democratic governments have the right to ig-
nore scientific advice” (2014, p. 5), Gluckman 
argues that the science advice practitioner must 
generally act “as an honest broker, of knowledge, 
not as an advocate” (2014, p. 7).
In other words, scientific advisers are not 
bound to fully subscribe to the definition of the 
problem suggested by those who convene them. 
Besides providing updated and reliable data and 
information from their own field of expertise, 
they should be able to acknowledge their intrin-
sic limitations and possibly provide indications 
on which other types of knowledge and expertise 
might be helpful for attaining a broader and more 
accurate perspective of what the problem at hand 
is and how it should be managed.
Not surprisingly, such critical and reflexive 
attitude is not common among experts because, 
as Fjelland puts it: “It is not part of professional 
training to learn about the limits of the models 
and methods of a field.” (Fjelland 2002, p. 165) 
He adds that the consequent “tunnel vision of 
experts is at least as great a problem as the ig-
norance of non-experts” (Fjelland 2002, p. 167).
Definitely the science advice necessary in 
the days preceding the (unpredictable) L’Aquila 
earthquake was not about an easy issue requiring 
technical solutions. The policy problem that had 
to be addressed was to guarantee, or at least to en-
hance, the safety of the exposed population, taking 
into consideration the complexity of the situation, 
including the seismic swarm, the state of the built 
environment, the local culture and traditions, the 
psychological stress of the population and their 
understandable impatience for a comforting mes-
sage. Such complexity and its management cannot 
possibly be reduced to a problem of controlling 
rumours interfering with sound scientific informa-
tion. Though a real problem, and a possible distur-
bance for “public order”, it is neither the main nor 
the only one when dealing with “public safety”.
Once more, Gluckman’s experience is in-
spiring in relation to the management of a cri-
sis which in many respects is similar to that 
described in this article: the February 22, 2011 
Christchurch earthquake, the second of two 
major earthquakes that hit the area within a six 
months period. I want to report his narration in 
some detail, to show that he conceived of his 
role as one of involving a multiplicity of actors, 
mediating between them, considering different 
needs and perspectives, and integrating different 
knowledges and skills. Among others, he took as 
his task that of leading the scientists “to under-
stand the need to provide simple and consistent 
communication” and to accept that “what was 
needed was communication of what was known 
and unknown” (Gluckman 2014, pp. 9–10).
In that contingency, also the need to con-
trol rumours was present. “More concerning was 
that the earthquake happened on the day of a full 
moon and, with that, an astrologer … got prime 
time TV coverage predicting an even bigger 
earthquake a month later when the moon and sun 
would be in alignment. … We faced a real chal-
lenge of how to calm the public, while acknowl-
edging that earthquakes can happen at any time. 
With the Science Media Center, I conducted a se-
ries of media briefings and this, plus the actions 
of some civic leaders, led to things settling. But I 
had my fingers crossed on March 20th – there was 
no big quake that day!” (Gluckman 2014, p. 10)
5 Conclusion
Gluckman’s final comment is about the role of 
chance, favourable for both the Christchurch 
population and himself in March 2011. Admit-
tedly the inhabitants of Abruzzo and the Italian 
experts where not so lucky two years earlier, 
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when a major earthquake struck just a week af-
ter the CGR meeting. Had it not struck or had it 
struck much later, the story would have been dif-
ferent. Yet the problems of scientific advice and 
its connected responsibilities in crisis manage-
ment remain unsolved, awaiting serious public 
scrutiny in Italy and possibly elsewhere.
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Information about ITAS
The Institute for Technology Assessment and 
Systems Analysis (ITAS) is a research facility 
of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). 
It is assessing technological impacts and 
comprehensive systemic interrelations of societal 
transformation processes and developments in 
science, technology, and the environment. The 
orientation of research and technology policy, the 
influence on the design of socio-technological 
systems and the realization of discursive processes 
on open and controversial questions on technology 
policy are some of the most important objectives. 
Parliaments and governments are the main 
addressees of this policy advice. The results of 
research and policy advice are publicly available. 
Regarding the object of research, work in ITAS is 
problem-oriented, it is organized in the form of 
projects, and the individual research disciplines 
are interdisciplinary. ITAS covers the whole 
spectrum of systems analysis and technology 
assessment for policy advice and technology 
design with its scientific, methodological, 
and procedural competences. Comprehensive 
analyses of societal problems and technological 
systems generally require a combination of 
various analytical processes which have to be 
coordinated for each individual project. For more 
information about ITAS see http://www.itas.kit.
edu/english/index.php.
